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Unmanned Aviation System (UAS) have leveraged considerably from the manned
aviation approach. This approach was useful to jumpstart this technology but it is
now time to find a more efficient and up-to-date approach, keeping with the
capabilities and limitation of the concurrent technology. Three technical areas to
mature and address the current limitations are recommended: 1) Selection for
UAS Personnel (SUPer), to accurately forecast candidate UAS operator
performance across UAS platforms and missions; 2) Distributed, Adaptive &
Modular entities for UAS (DyAdeM), to automatically generate realistic &
adaptive synthetic environments for simulated UAS training; and, 3) UAS Control
Station Human Machine Interface (CaSHMI), to provide validated information
display concepts.
Beginning in FY12, the US Navy and Marine Corps began to significantly increase their
rate of acquisition of a wide range of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) platforms. The Army and
Air Force have already fielded thousands of these systems in the past decade and plan to
continue to do so. These UASs will include significant technological advances, blending
automation with dynamic, decentralized control, and will support a wide range of missions. Yet,
despite these technological advances and increases in automation, these systems do not lend
themselves to easy use by their operators. From a human systems integration perspective, they
are not well-supported by control station interfaces, training technologies, or selection tools; as
indicated by the fact that as much as 50 percent of all UAS mishaps are attributed to human
factors (Williams, 2004; Tvaryanas, 2005, 2006).
Reducing mishaps and unsuccessful UAS operations will require better interface design
and a new kind of operator - one who has been specifically selected, trained and equipped to
process information safely and effectively. They must interact with cutting-edge technologies,
work collaboratively with others, and effectively manage their cognitive workload and attention
over long mission durations (McCarely & Wickens, 2005). Since the 1990s, all three services
have conducted varying levels of investigation to better understand how to select Air Vehicle
Operators (AVOs), how to train them, and how to equip them. These early studies often assumed
that selection and training criteria should be similar to those used in manned aviation (Barnes, et
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al, 2000; Hall & Tirre, 1998) and that manned aviation was the gold standard against which UAS
AVO requirements should be considered. Many of these early studies focused on assessing UAS
operator requirements for platforms whose control schema and missions mirrored those of
manned aviation platforms (Biggerstaff et al, 1998; Kay et al, 1999). The UAS landscape has
changed with fiscal realities and evolving mission sets, combined with significant advances in
the state of the art of UAS platforms and control schema, which have all evolved the AVO into a
mission manager vice a hands-on controller. Today, simply replicating the manned aviation
select-train-equip approach is an inefficient solution at best and a potential disaster at worst
(McCarley & Wickens, 2005). As stated by a recent US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board:
"the considerable base of human factors knowledge derived from cockpit experience may have
limited applicability to future systems…" (US Air Force, 2004).
While this sentiment speaks to future aviation systems at large, UASs are a significant
departure from traditional roles and responsibilities for its human operator (Figure 1). First, the
AVOs, unlike manned aviators, are not co-located with their platform. This decoupling of the
human from the system has created unique human system integration issues (Tvaryanas, 2006).
Compared to their manned aviation counterparts, AVOs work in sensory-deprived conditions,
lacking the visual, auditory, and tactile cues present in manned aviation. Second, as automation
becomes more reliable, the role of the AVO will continue to shift towards mission management,
likely of multiple and different UAS platforms (Tvaryanas, 2006). Even today, AVOs, especially
for larger more capable UASs, interact with their systems more through decision making, course
of action planning, collaborative planning, and resource management than through hands-on
'stick and rudder' skills (Kay, et al., 1999). These roles and responsibilities are more reflective of
mission management activities, like those of an Air Traffic Controller.

Figure 1: The Evolving Role of Human in Aviation Systems. In the early days of
aviation, aviators had a very direct connection with their platform – basically a one-to-one
mapping between the control inputs they provided and the subsequent behaviors the aircraft
responded with. As aircraft became more complex, this mapping changed. With these changes
came a shift in the role of the aviator, with a corresponding shift in the KSAOs they need in
order to succeed. Today, UAS represent the most radical shift yet in this role, with the operators
being ‘dis’ located from their platform; their inputs have very limited direct impact on their
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aircraft’s moment-by-moment action and mission success depends more on individual operators’
ability to process and act on information and coordinate with other team members.
These, and other, differences between manned and unmanned aerial systems require new
technologies and methodologies to ensure effective UAS operations. One approach is to address
the selection, training, and interface design gaps as equal parts of a common approach for
optimizing Human System Integration. This will require a detailed examination of: the types of
Knowledge Skills and Abilities (KSAs) necessary to succeed in UAS operations; the best
approaches for utilizing simulation-based training; and design approaches that will provide UAS
operators with an effective way of interacting with their systems. The remainder of this paper
discusses how the different Services may address these three areas.
Selection
Effective selection procedures identify individuals who possess a minimum level of
qualifications and aptitude in the relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform specific
tasks and missions. Done properly, selection and classification procedures match overall training
and interface design requirements. For manned aviation, the Department of the Navy uses a
secure, web-based test delivery platform called the Automated Pilot Exam (APEX) to deliver the
manned Aviation Selection Test Battery (ASTB) worldwide. APEX is government-owned and is
capable of delivering psychomotor evaluations, tests of divided attention, and reaction-time
evaluations using stick-and-throttle inputs or keyboard and mouse. It is also capable of
administering computer-adaptive multiple-choice tests, which tailor test content to the
examinee’s ability level; this reduces test length, increases score accuracy, and greatly improves
test security.
UAS platforms represent a unique domain from the perspective of the KSAs needed for
successful operations. This is partly due to the wide range of platforms and missions that UAS
support and partly due to the unique role that UAS operators are asked to assume. UAS operators
must excel at integrating information from partial, incomplete, and abstracted data, attained from
multiple sources, in collaboration with other UAS operators who may be located across vast
geographical and temporal ranges. In the near future, they may also be required to concurrently
operate more than one platform and perform more than one mission goal. As the technical
capabilities of these platforms continue to grow, along with the mission sets, these cognitive and
social competencies will have a far greater influence on mission success than the traditional ones
currently selected for in manned aviation.
There are currently no tools in place to select and classify candidate UAS operators based
on these competencies. Preliminary research suggests that such tools should include an emphasis
on assessing: spatial capabilities (McKinley et al, 2011); social and interpersonal abilities and
personality traits (Kay et al 1999; Carretta & Ree, 2003); executive processes, like attention
management, information processing, multitasking, and decision making (Squire &
Parasuraman, 2010; McKinley et al 2011); and human-autonomy interactions (McCarley &
Wickens, 2005; Squire & Parasuraman, 2010). Similarly, there are no standards, policies, and
guidelines for developing UAS operator career fields based on these competencies. Manpower
and personnel decisions regarding the candidate pool from which AVOs are chosen have
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historically been based on manned aviation requirements rather than on UAS operational
requirements. Recent studies conducted by the Air Force suggest that non-aviators may be as
competent as aviators in terms of many of the KSAs associated with UAS operations (McKinley,
et al., 2011).
Current efforts focus on developing a series of assessments to identify individuals with
appropriate UAS AVO-relevant aptitudes and KSAs from populations including both military
(Enlisted and Officer) and civilian personnel, as well as individuals with or without previous
manned flight experience. The expected results from these efforts include the identification of
KSAs and behaviorally anchored proficiency requirements for UAS AVO operators; the degree
to which each KSA can be satisfied using civilian, Enlisted, or Officer candidates, and whether
those candidates should have prior manned flight experience; and an identification of KSAs best
attained through a training curriculum, along with guidelines for how to structure such a
curriculum.
Training
Typical simulation-based training for aviation requires the integration of hundreds, if not
thousands, of simulated entities into the overall training scenario. Developing these entities
requires significant time and effort and results in entities whose behaviors are strictly guided,
scripted, and limited based on pre-determined rules that define the entities' behaviors over the
course of the training scenario. The net result is entities whose behaviors are not realistic, leading
to reduced training effectiveness; yet this training requires significant effort to create, thus
having prohibitively high authoring costs.
An alternative approach is to replace hand-coded rule sets with a capability to
automatically generate new and appropriate Computer Generated Forces (CGF) behaviors from
one or more data sources including: data captured during live UAS exercises or data captured as
experts operate their systems within a simulated environment. On the basis of one or more of
these initial data sets, it should then be possible to model those behaviors and provide new
behaviors that will drive CGF entities in a training environment. This approach will require
integrating cognitive modeling approaches with machine learning techniques to generate
tactically authentic behaviors. Recent advances in the development of knowledge structures
(Bermejo, 2006; Koeing, 2009) provide a formal approach for representing and characterizing
underlying behaviors from large data sets (Boyce & Pahl, 2007), making it possible to capture
structured data from multiple sources. Cognitive models provide a means of formally
representing these underlying behaviors of interest. Machine learning techniques provide a wide
range of inductive approaches to generalize these behaviors to new missions and contexts.
Training objectives, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) bound the initial
cognitive models and subsequent machine learning generalization to ensure that new behaviors
are tactically authentic. The resultant behaviors can then be integrated into new training
scenarios.
Current efforts focus on providing the underlying behaviors that drive CGFs. Of
particular interest are behaviors driving large numbers of entities that provide the ecological
background against which the “Patterns of Life” play out in the scenario. These include

344

seemingly random actions of groups of individuals, ground vehicles, or surface ships as they
affect and are affected by the trainee's actions. The manner in which these behaviors drive CGF,
as well as the manner in which these forces are represented to the trainee, should be part of the
design developed.
Interface Design
Critical challenges with using a single system to display information relating to operating
multiple and different types of UAS platforms include: characterizing the necessary information
that operators must interpret to make effective decisions; providing information in a way that
allows for task switching and multi-tasking without reducing operator performance; enabling
AVOs to manage the flow of information from UASs with varying levels of autonomy;
supporting collaboration with other UAS teams and support personnel; and designing flexibility
into the system to account for new platforms, missions and advances in information display
technologies - such as those that adapt information based on context, mission, and user
performance. At the core of this challenge lies the need to find platform-common information
and platform-specific information requirements. These requirements should consider the mission
characteristics required to perform in a “Patterns of Life” scenario. Once identified, follow the
manned aviation lead in developing a “common” approach to representing basic aviation
information (Wiener & Nagel, 1988; Mejdal, McCauley & Beringer, 2001). Approaches for
representing information which will optimize AVO performance should be developed and design
guidelines and solutions should be implemented similarly to other mission management-like
domains, such as Air Traffic Control (Friedman-Berg, Yuditsky, & Smith, 2004). Traditional
human factors techniques, (e.g., Wickens & Hollands, 2000) as well as more recently developed
neuroergonomic assessment methodologies (e.g., Parasuraman & Rizzo, 2007), are expected to
form the basis for much of this technical area.
Current efforts focus on documenting human factors-driven design guidance developed,
in coordination with the appropriate Navy leads, for the Common Control System; CGF
improvements to AVO training; and inputs and recommendations for KSAs to be part of AVO
candidate selection and classification. For test and evaluation purposes, the Navy will make use
of simulated Common Control stations, populated with CGFs and appropriate mission scenarios.
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